Key hygiene: custody rules for wallets a program signs with

Automation needs a key that can sign without a human present. That single requirement rules out every custody model built around physical confirmation, and it is why a bot wallet is a hot wallet no matter how careful you are. The work is not eliminating that exposure. The work is deciding exactly how much each exposed key can reach, and making sure the answer is written down somewhere other than your memory.

These three pages are the custody layer of the site. They cover the threat model for a signing key, the tier structure that limits what any one compromise reaches, and the storage and rotation practices that keep keys replaceable. Nothing here asks you to enter a seed phrase anywhere.

Assumption Any key a running process can read is a key that can leak
Boundary Tiers are enforced by balance, not by intention
Non-negotiable Seed phrases never enter a config, a site or a chat

3 procedures in this section

How keys are generated, where they live, what each one is allowed to touch, and how you rotate them without losing access to the accounts they control.

03

Key storage and rotation

Where a seed phrase and a signing key can safely live, what encryption at rest actually buys you, and a rotation procedure that never leaves an account unreachable.

Open the procedure

How this section is used

Custody decisions are the ones you make once and live with for years, so they deserve the slowest reading on this site. Start with the threat model, design the tiers before you fund anything, and treat rotation as routine maintenance rather than a response to a scare. When a key does look exposed, the ordered response is in the monitoring section.